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DISTRIBUTIVE PRODUCTION SETS AND 
EQUILIBRIA WITH INCREASING RETURNS
Abstract
We give a necessary and sufficient condition on production sets 
under which average cost pricing is compatible with voluntary trading 
This condition defines a class of production sets which is related to 























































































































































































In the present paper, we investigate the properties of a 
class of production sets which exhibit increasing returns to scale. 
The concept of distributive production set was originally introduced 
by Scarf in a paper which has been circulating since 1963 and very 
often quoted. It has now been published among the Contribut ions to 
Mathematical Economics edited by W. Hildenbrand and A. Mas Colell in 
Honor of Gérard Debreu (1986). Scarf’s paper did fit within his quest 
of a solution to "the problem of incorporating increasing returns in 
an analytical framework with the generality of the Walrasian model of 
equilibrium", to quote him (p. 401).
In his paper. Scarf considers economies with an aggregate 
production set in which some inputs, "producer commodities", do no 
enter into consumers’ preferences. The relevance of the concept of 
distributive sets for the core follows from the fact that, for such 
economies, distributivity is a necessary and sufficient condition for 
the non-emptiness of the core.
To prove existence of a core allocation. Scarf introduces a 
concept of equilibrium which he defines as an allocation and a price 
sys tern at which :
- consumers maximise utility subject to the budget constraint 
implied by the value of their initial endowments;
- profit is zero but maximum over the feasible production plans 
using no greater amounts of producer commodities than available.
This defines what Scarf calls a "social equilibrium", which is a kind 
of competitive equilibrium, profit being maximum over the production 
set truncated by the available quantities of producer commodities.




























































































economy and the existence of an equilibrium is proven for economies 
with distributive production sets.
The present paper extends a previous paper (19S6) in which 
we suggest a concept of equ ilibrium of a compe titive type for eco­
nomies in which production technologies are not necessarily convex. 
The idea is to redefine the behavior of the firms in a perfectly 
competitive environment in such a way as to allow for non-convex 
technologies. At an equilibrium, each firm maximises profit, given 
the prices, over the feasible production plans whose quantities of 
output do not exceed the observed levels of demand, a condition of 
voluntary trading. and output prices are minimal among the prices at 
which the firm accepts to meet the demand for its products. In the 
convex case, this is shown to be equivalent to profit maximisation. 
The outcome of this behavior is not necessarily average cost pricing 
i.e. profit could be positive at an equilibrium, like at a compe­
titive equilibrium. The initial purpose of the present paper is to 
define the class of non-convexities for which a similar behavior 
leads to a situation of zero profit.
Inspired by the definition of distributive production set 
of Scarf, we suggest a symmetric definition which applies to situa­
tions where producers are constrained in their supply of output, 
instead of being constrained in their demand for input. As a slight 
departure from our previous paper, we shall assume here that profits 
instead of output prices are minimised. We show that indeed, for 
such technologies, voluntary trading together with minimisation of 
profit gives rise to average cost prices which, in addition, are 




























































































The paper is organised as follows. The concept of 
distributive production set is introduced in Section 2 . We use the 
term "input-distributive" to cover the definition of Scarf, and the 
term "output-distributive” for our definition. The properties of 
distributive production sets are reviewed in Section 3. with emphasis 
on output-distributive sets. In particular, the relations with the 
concept of supportable cost function and Aumann-Shapley average cost 
prices are studied. Finally, in Section 4. the idea of voluntary 
trading and minimality of profit are formalised and introduced in a 
general equilibrium framework.
2. DEFINITIONS.
0Let (R be the commodity space where 0 is the number of
pcommodities. A production set is defined as a subset Y of 1R' and we 
shall use the following assumptions
A.l Y is a closed set
A.2 0 € Y (feasibility of inaction)
A. 3 Y + IR̂  C Y (free disposal)
The first two assumptions are standard and universally accepted. The 
third assumption says that Y is a comprehensive set. To define 
distributivity. we must assume that the input-output configuration is 
a priori f ixed1
A.4 There is a number k. 1 < k < £-1. such that any production
kplan y € Y can be written as y = (a.b). where a € IR and 
b € K?_k: if (a.b) € Y. then (a.b+) e Y.




























































































Consequently, the outputs never appear as inputs and could all be
produced, not necessarily simultaneously, in some positive quantity.
There are k inputs.and 0-k outputs. We denote by I = {1.... k} the
set of inputs and by Ic . its complement, the set of outputs. It is 
to-be noticed that the commodities which are not related to the 
production process described by Y are included in the set of inputs.2
The assumptions A.l to A.4 will be assumed to hold through­
out this section. For any finite collection ,yn ) of points in
(R̂ . we denote by C(y*.... yn ) the convex cone with vertex 0 generated
by these points C(y*.... y11) = {y € 1R̂  | y = 2 a^y^ , > 0
A production set Y is input-dtstrtbuttve if for any finite 
collection ( y y n ) of production plans, y^ = (a^.b^) € Y for all 
j. the following inclusion is satisfied
C(y*.... yn ) f"l (y € IR̂ | y = (a.b). a < a*̂  for all j } C Y.
In words, any (non-negative) weighted sum of feasible production 
plans must be feasible if it does not use less inputs than any of the 
original plans. An illustration is provided in Figure 1.
This is essentially the definition introduced by Scarf in
1963. However, closedness of Y was not included in the definition
£and a weaker form of free disposal was assumed, namely IR_ C Y. We 
use here the term "input-distributive" to distinguish his definition 
from the one we shall introduce now, for which the stronger version 




























































































A production set Y is output-distributive if for any finite
collection (y*.... yn ) of production plans, y  ̂ = (a^.b^) € Y for all
j, the following inclusion is satisfied
C( y *.... yn ) n {y 6 IR? | y = (a.b), b > bJ for all j } C Y .
In words, any (non-negative) weigthed sum of feasible production 
plans must be feasible if it involves more outputs than any of the 
original plans. An illustration is provided in Figure 2.
Obviously, the two definitions cover the constant returns 
case where Y is a cone, and they are equivalent in the one input-one 
output case. The properties of distributive sets, some of which are 
common to both types, will now be reviewed.
3. PROPERTIES.
In this section, we shall study the basic properties of 
^distributive production sets. We shall however concentrate our 
attention on output-distributive sets. Throughout this section, we 






























































































Distributivity is stronger than increasing returns to scale 
(sometimes called "global economies of scale”) in the sense that, if
Y is distributive, the following property is satisfied
y € Y and X > 1 implies Xy € Y .
Furthermore. Y is superadditiue■
y and y ’ € Y implies y + y ’ € Y.
Superadditivity implies that a firm whose technology is described by 
a distributive production set is a natural monopoly [see for 
instance Sharkey (1982)]. These properties are immediate for 
input-distributive sets, in which case free disposal (A.3) actually
pfollows from the weaker assumption IR_ C Y. For ou t pu t-d i s t r i bu t i ve 
sets however, the assumption A.3 and A.4 are necessary to prove that 
these properties hold. For instance, let y.y € Y. Then, we have 
y + y = (a+a,b+b) i (a+a,b++b+ ). where b + + b+ > b.b. Then, by output- 
distributivity, (a+a,b*+b+ ) € Y. and by free disposal, y+y € Y.
Let us denote price systems p = (p^.p^). where p^ € IR̂  and
p -kp^ € IR+ denote the input prices and the output prices respecti­
vely. The associated cost function is defined by
c(b,p ) = inf (-P .a),
a (a .b)€Y a
and we denote by B = { b € IR̂  ^ | 3 a £ n'j such that (a,b) € Y } the 
set of producible output vectors. Clearly, XB C B for all X £ 1 and
B + B C B. Hence, the assumptions A.3 and A.4 ensure that, whenever
H-kY is a distributive production set, B coincides with IR+ and the
p-k kcost function is then defined for all b € IR+ and all p^ € (R+ . 
Furthermore, as a consequence of the above properties, the cost 




























































































(i) for all b € [R^'k . € Rk and A > l, cJAb.p^) S \c(b,pa ).
(Ii) for all b°.b 1 £ R^'k and p E Rk .+ a +
c(b°+b’.pa ) i c(b°.pa ) + c(b'.pa ).
Let dY denote the boundary of Y. Because Y is a closed and 
comprehensive set. 3Y coincides with the set of (weakly) efficient 
production plans : 3Y = (y € Y | jj y' € Y. y' >> y }.
3.2 Properties of input-distributive production sets.
Let Y be input-distributive. As a first consequence of the 
definition, the "isoinput" sets are convex For ail a € IR_. the set 
= {y € Y | y = (a.b)-} is convex (Scarf, p . 4 1 l ) . The importance of 
input-distributive sets stems from the fact that the following 
condition is essentially3 a necessary and sufficient condition for 
i npu t-d i s t r i bu t i v i ty :
I f  xFor all y € Y for which there does not exist y € Y. y > y and
m c Py, > y, for some h € I . there exists p € (R . p  ̂ 0. such that : n h +
(1) 0 = p.y* > p.y for all y € Y. y^ > y* for all h € I.
I fCondition (1) characterises the price systems at which y maximises
I fprofit when the demand for inputs is constrained by y^. h € I. It is 
a condition of voluntary trading in the sense that, at such 
prices, it is profitable for the firm to use the inputs in quanti- 
ties y^ instead of using less.
[nput-distributivity has implications for the associated




























































































l-kthere exist output prices p^ 6 IR+ such that
(2) 0 =  Pb -b* - c(b*.pa ) 2 Pb -b - c(b.pa )
P — Is Mfor all b € IR+ such that c(b,paJ $ c(b ,pa ). This property will 
latter be contrasted with a related property which applies to the 
output-distributive case.
3.3 Properties of output-distributive productions sets.
Let Y be output-distributive. The first observation to
make is that the "isoquants” are then non-empty and convex : For all 
f - k ib € [R . the set Y, = {y € Y y = (a,b) } is non-empty and convex, b
This is an immediate consequence of the definition and of the assump­
tions A.3 and A.4. The interest of output-distributivity stems from 
the following two propositions which together provide a necessary and 
sufficient condition for output-distributivity.
Propos i t i on 1 Let Y be output-distributive. Then for all y € dY .
pthere exists p € IR+ . p * 0. such that
(3) 0 = p.y* > p.y for all y € Y. y^ i Max (O.y*). h € Ic .
If If CProof Let us first consider y € dY such that yb 2 0 for all h € I 
We define T = {y = 2 aJyJ | aj i 0, yJ « Y, yj 1 y* V h e Ic . Vj >. 
the smallest convex cone with vertex 0 containing the truncated 
production set {y € Y| y^ i y^ for all h € I }.
T has free disposal. This follows directly from the fact
| fthat T is a cone and Y has itself free disposal. Clearly, y € T.




























































































Otherwise, y = 2 for some ( y a ^ )  such that for all j. y* € Y.
> 0 and y^ < y* for all h € Ic . Then, y* < y, for ail h implies h ” h n n
i f  i fy € Y. contradicting y € dY. We can then conclude that y € <3T and
i fthat there exists a supporting hyperplane passing through 0 and y 
£ kThere exists p € R+ . p * 0. 0 = p.y > p.y for all y € T and in
| f  Qparticular for all y € Y such that y^ < y^ , h € I .
| f  QWe shall now show that if y, > 0 for some h € I . thereh
exists a vector p satisfying (3) such that p^ = 0 for all i € Ic with
I fy^ = 0. Without loss of generality, let us assume that for some m.
| f  | f  | f  |fy, . .... y > 0  and y ,=...= y„ = 0. One easily verifies thatJ k+1 m tn+1 J  P ’
Z = {z € Rm | (z.0) € X } is an output-distributive production set and
| f  |f  | f  njthat z = (y.... y ) € dZ. Hence there exits q € R" . q * 0. such1 m ♦
i f  i fthat 0 = q.z > q.z for all z € Z with z^ < z^. h = k+l.... m and the
pvector p = (q.0) € IR̂  satisfies condition (3).
Let us now consider the general case. If y* i 0 for all
c P *h € I . any element of the normal cone to IR_ at y satisfies
condition (3) and the normal cone is well-defined and contains a
non-zero element. In order to deal with the case where y* > 0 forl
some i € Ic . we consider the vector y defined by y^ = y*. h € I. and
— | f  Qy^ = Max (O.y^), h € I . Then, there exists a p  ̂ 0 such that
— * c0 = P Y  > p.y for all y € Y with y^ < Max(O.y^). h € I If now
y* > 0 for some i € Ic , y. > 0 and p can be choosen different from l J l
the origin and such that p, = 0 for all h € Ic with y, = 0. Hence, ph n
can be choosen in such a way that p.y* = p.y = 0. |j
c *Remark Note from the proof that, if for some i € I y. = 0 in (3), 
the i-th coordinate of the price vector p can be choosen freely in IR+ 
subject only to the restriction p ? 0 . Furthermore, if for some




























































































it pProposition 2 If for all y € dY. there exists p € IR . p / 0. 
satisfying condition (3), then Y is output-distributive
Proof Let us fix some (y^) and (a^) such that for all j, y^ € Y.
£ 0 and y > for all h € Ic where y = 2 a^y^. Assume that h h
y € Y. Then, because the output vector defined by y is producible
and free disposal applies to the isoquants, there exists y* € dY such
it ' _ ^ — - cthat y < y for all h € I. and y, = y, for all h € In n n n
£Therefore, there exists p € IR+ , p / 0, satisfying (3) and,
i I — itin particular, p.yJ < 0 for all j. because y^ $ y, = y, for all h €n n ri
I Hence, p.y i 0 and. because p.y = 0. this is possible only if 
p. = 0 for all i € I. From the remark made after Proposition 1, we
know that p^y^ > 0 for all h € Ic . Hence, p^y* = 0 for all h € Ic .
cBut p^ can be choosen equal to zero whenever h € I with y^ $ 0,
c *Hence p / 0 implies that for some h € I . p. > 0 and y, > 0,h h
contradicting p^y* = 0. |
Output distributivity has an interesting implication for 
the cost function, beyond subhomogeneity and subadditivity:
Proposi ti on 3 The cost function associated with an output-
distributive set is supportable, i.e. for any given input prices
k m £ — k P — kPa € !R+ and outputs b € IR+ , there exist output prices p^ € IR+
such that
(4) 0 = Pb b* - c(b*.pa ) l pb -b - c{b.pa ) .
for all b e IR*'k . b <, b*.




























































































Lemma 1 Let Y be output-distributive. Then, for any input prices p
k i i l  + i?—k€ IR̂  and any finite collection of points (aJ .bJ) in IR + such that
1 > b* for all i. the following condition is satisfied
(5) c(2ajbj .pj i Sajc(bj ,p ).a tx
Proof Let a^ € { a € IR̂  | - p . a = cfb^.p ) 1 and define y = (a.b),— a a
y = 1 a*^(a^,b^). By ou tpu t-d i s t r i bu t i v i ty . y € Y and the re f o re , we
have (- p .a) > c(b.p ) where p .a = I cr̂ p .a1 = - 2 a Jc(bJ.p ). | a a a a a
The property of supportabi1ity corresponds to the 
definition introduced by Sharkey and Telser (1978) where they show 
that condition (5) is actually a necessary and sufficient condition 
for supportabi1ity. Condition (4) has to be contrasted with 
condition (2) which applies to input-distributive production sets. 
There, the alternative output vectors considered were those with a 
smaller cost of production. Here instead, we consider those with 
smaller quantities of outputs.4
A converse to Proposition 3 holds, namely
Propos i t ion 4 Let us assume that Y is a production set with convex 
isoquants. If the resulting cost function is supportable at all 
output vectorsand input prices, then Y is output-distributive.
Proof Let us fix some (y^) in Y and define y = 2a^y^ • Y = (a.b),
where b^ > 0 for all j and the a^ ’s are choosen in such a way that b
> b^ for all j. If c is a supportable cost function, then we have
c(b,p ) < 2a^c(b^,p ) for all p € IR^. Furthermore, y^ € Y implies a a a +
c(bJ,p ) < (- p .a^). Hence, we also have c(b,p ) < (- p .a) for all a a a a
kPa € IR+ . Because the set Y^ is convex and has the free disposal 




























































































Figures 3 and 4 illustrate why convexity and free disposal are 
necessary to prove this result which would not hold at y there, since 
these points are compatible with cost-supportabi 1ity but not with 
output-distributivi ty.
Figure 3 Figure 4
To conclude this section, let us consider the output prices 
defined by equitable cost sharing A la Aumann-Shapley [see Mirman and 
Tauman (1982)]. These are average cost prices which support the 
cost function for a class of output-distributive technologies :
Proposition 5 Let us fix the prices of the inputs at some p^ € 1R̂  
and assume that the cost function c(.,p^) is quasi-convex.
I _khomogeneous of degree r < 1 and differentiable on Int IR̂  . Then.
* P — kfor any given b € Int 1R+ , condition (4) is satisfied by the
Aumann-Shapley prices defined by :
Ph = Jg ch(Xb*.pa )d\ (h € IC ) 
where c^ denotes the marginal cost of producing output h.
The proof of this result is a straightforward transposition of the 
proof given by Greenberg and Shitovitz (1984). Their result, which 
applies in the input-distribut1ve case with a single output, says 




























































































sense of Scarf. The assumptions they make applies to the revenue 
function, in particular quasi-concavity and homogeneity of degree 
r 1. As suggested by these authors. Proposition 5 could be 
generalised to the case where the cost function is not necessarily 
quasi-convex but can be decomposed as a sum of quasi-convex. 
homogeneous and differentiable functions.*
4. GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM.
4.1 Voluntary trading and minimal profit.
When production sets are non-convex. the behavior of 
producers is best represented by pricing rules which define the 
acceptable prices corresponding to every possible efficient 
production plan. This idea can be found in Dierker. Guesnerie and 
Neuefeind (1985) and has been elaborated further since [see
Bonnisseau and Cornet (1986) for the most recent contribution]. More
pprecisely, a pricing rule is a correpondence ^ : dY -* IR̂  and. at an 
equilibrium, the condition p € P(y) " holds for all firms. For
exemple. 'p could define marginal or average cost pricing. More 
sophisticated pricing behaviors may also be covered by using pricing 
rules which depend on additionnal variables like market prices and 
the plans of other agents. To be able to prove the existence of a 
general equilibrium, the pricing rules should be closed 
correspondences and their values should be non-degenerated convex 
cones with vertex zero. Furthermore, the losses, if any, implied by 
the use of these pricing rules should be bounded in one way or 
another to avoid bankruptcy of the economy.
The purpose of this section is to construct a particular 
pricing rule which incorporates voluntary trading and minimality of 




























































































output-distributive production sets. It is inspired by our previous 
work on competitive equilibria with increasing returns (1986) where 
we also use the pricing rule approach.
Let Y be a production set satisfying the assumptions A.I to 
A.3. We first define the set of price systems which, for any given 
production plan y € 3Y. satisfy uoluntary trading
*(y) = {p € R*I p.y i p .y ' for all y'€ Y. y'i y+ }.
At p € <p(y), it is profitable for the firm to produce the quantities 
y^, h € Ic , instead of producing less. As a consequence* at 
P ^ *f(y). the cost of producing the output vector y* is minimised.
Clearly, for all y € dY. •fi(y) is a non-degenera ted convex 
cone with vertex 0 and it defines a correspondence -f: dY -> whose
graph i s closed.6
For any given y € dY. the set *>(y) is typically large (in 
particular, it does not place any upperbound on output prices). It 
is therefore not an appropriate pricing rule. In our previous paper, 
our attention was concentrated on the subset of <#>(y) in which output 
prices were minimal (vectorwise). Here instead we shall restrict our
attention to those output prices in <*>(y) at which profit is minimal.
* £This defines the correspondence f ■ 3Y -* R+ by :
**(y) = {p € <#>(y) | i p ’ € <#>(y). p^ = Ph ,h € I(y). p .y < p.y }
where I(y) = { h | y^ < 0 or y^ < 0 for all y* € Y } denotes the set 




























































































When the input-output configuration is fixed. I(y ) is
larger than I because it includes outputs which are disposed of.
However, this does not affect the definition of «p* because in <p(y)
these commodities have a zero price. It is to be noted that the
price systems in <p (y) involve minimal prices for those outputs which
are actually produced. If y, =0, h € IC , the h-th coordinate of theh *price vectors in <p(y), and in <p (y). can be freely choosen in 1R . By
contrast, in our previous paper where minimality applies to the
prices of all outputs, p, = 0 for all h € Ic with y, = 0.n n
itClearly. p (y) is a convex cone with vertex zero. But it 
may be degenerated and the graph of the correspondence is not 
necessarily closed. It is therefore necessary to enlarge it to 
obtain a well defined pricing rule. Let us define
(6) Hy) = co (p e j 3 (yu .p") -* (y-p). yu£ 3Y/<o>, puc +*(yu) }
where the correspondence p is given by:
*̂* (y )
+*(y) = -#>(y ) n !Ny{y) 
*(y)
if '•'"(y) * {o>.
if >̂*(y) = {0} and *(y) D INy(y) * {0}. 
otherwise.
Here, IN^C•) denotes the cone of Clarke [see Clarke (1975) and 
Rockafellar (1979)]. By construction, p is a closed correspondence 
whose values are non-degenerated convex cones with vertex zero. 
Because <p is a closed correspondence, \p satisfies 'P(y) C >p(y) for all 
y € c?Y. Furthermore, if Y is convex, 'P(y) = IN^(y) for all y € dY. 
where in this case !Ny(y) is the cone of normals. Hence, in the 





























































































These results are obtained by transposing the arguments 
developed in our previous paper. In the output-distributive case, 
where a given inpu.t-output configuration is assumed, we have the 
following result
Lemma 2 When Y is an output-distributive production set. is a
closed correspondence whose values are non-degenerated convex cones 
with vertex zero.
Proof By Proposition 1. for all y € dX there exists p € */>(y). p * 0
such that p.y = 0. Therefore, »p*(y) ^ {0}. By Proposition 3. p.y = 
*0 for all p € <p (y) and all y € dX. Therefore, we have
-p**(y ) = v>(y) n { p e ir£ | p.y = o
*and is a closed correspondence, being the intersection of closed
correspondences. |
As a consequence, in the output-distributive case, the
pricing rule ^ satisfies: -̂ (y) = ip*(y) for all y € dX . y ^ 0.
& p & PAt the origin. (0) = (R+ and the case where ^ (0) = IR+ corresponds
to the existence of set-up costs, a situation in which ^ does not
place any restriction on prices at the origin. Our conjecture is
that 0) collects the marginal cost at the origin 1^(0) = >//(0).
K ^ k KLet us fix y € dY, p E +(y ) and define (a ,b ) by = y^ 
h € I and b* = Max(0,y*), h £ Ic . If b* ? 0, then cost are 
minimised, i.e. (- Pa •a ) = c(b ,Pa ), anc* ^b suPPorts t*ie cost 
function at b , i.e. condition (4) is satisfied. In the case where
ab =0. our conjecture is that p^ € d^c(0,pa ), where d^c denotes 





























































































4.2 A generai equilibriti» concept.
Let us consider an economy in which there are m consumers 
and n firms. Consumers are indexed by i and characterized by a 
consumption set X^, a preference relation , an initial endowment
vector and shares in profits (0.j)* c^ese characteristics we
make the following assumptions :
C.1 is a closed subset of IR . convex and bounded below.
C.2 >. is a complete, continuous, convex7 and non-satiated
preordering of Xj.
C.3 There exists x. € X. such that x. << w .i i i i
The shares in profits satisfy 0 . . > 0 for all i.j and 2.0.. = 1 for 
all j. These are the assumptions of Debreu’s "Theory of Value” 
(1959), and they do not require particular comments. They could of 
course be weakened but the emphasis is here on the production side.
Firms are indexed by j and characterised by a production 
set Yj which satisfies the assumptions A.l. A.2 and A.3. The set of 
feasible allocations is given by:
al = ( (y.....y .x,.... x ) € ITY.x/IX. | lx . < ly . ♦ 2<j .l w l n 1 m ’ j i 1 i " Jj i '
It is a non-empty subset of |R^(n+m) and we assume that
B. the set sA is compact in [R^n + m .̂
The assumptions made so far ensure the existence of a competitive 
equilibrium in the case where the aggregate production set 2Ŷ . is 




























































































The behavior of consumers is standard they optimise 
according to their preferences under a budget constraint in which the 
value of their, initial endowment and their shares in profits appear. 
The behavior of the firms is assumed to be described by the pricing 
rule ^  , as defined in (6).
Formally, an equilibrium is defined by a price system p in
2IR+ , p ï 0, a set of consumption plans (x^.... x^) and a set of
x xproduction plans (y^,...yn ) satisfying the following conditions :
E.l 2 x* = S y* + 2 u. .i j i
E.2 For all i. x. is >.-maximal in the budget set l “ l
{x. € X . I p.x.< p.oj. + 2.0. . p . y* }. v i i , K  i " K i i i J J
E . 3 For all j. y. € dY . and p € ^ (y.). J J j J
The first two conditions are part of the definition of competitive
x xequilibrium. Condition E.3 implies that p € <p(y^) i.e. y . maximises 
p.ŷ . on the subset { y^ € Y | y^ < (y*) + }, implying that costs are 
minimised. This condition defines profit maximisation if Yj is a 
convex set. In the case where Y^ satisfies the assumption A.4 and is 
output-distributive, condition E.3 implies P-Yj = 0. Output prices 
are then average costs.8 In addition, they are anonymously equitable
and subsidy free.
Propos i t ion 6 Under the assumptions C.l to C.3. A.l to A.3 and B. 




























































































Proof Several existence proofs for models with general pricing rules 
are available, in particular by Kamya (1984) and by Bonnlsseau and 
Cornet (1986). Our previous paper contains also an existence proof 
for loss-free pricing rules. However, because it allows to prove the 
existence of an equilibrium where demand equals supply, instead of a 
free disposal equilibrium, we shall use here the result of Bonnisseau 
and Cornet (1986) which applies to pricing rules whose losses are 
uniformly bounded below.
The assumption C.2 implies that consumers' preferences can be 
represented by continuous, quast-concave and locally nonsatiated
futility functions. Let S denote the unit simplex of IR̂ . Then, by 
Lemma 2. the pricing rules p^ 's defined by i*.(y) = +j(y) fl S are 
upper hemicontinuous correspondences with convex and compact values. 
Because p.y > 0 for all y € <5Y ̂ and p € 4<^(y). the pricing rules Pj's 
entail no loss and therefore losses are uniformly bounded below. 
Together with the assumption C.3, this ensures that the wealth of the 
consumers always exceeds their minimal wealth. This completes the 
verification of the assumptions introduced by Bonnisseau and Cornet, 






























































































(1) Notation: For any given vector x, we denote by x + the vector of
same dimension defined by x* = Max(O.x^). For vector inequalities, 
we adopt the following sequence of symbols: >, >, >>.
(2) Scarf introduces a distinction between "producers commodities" 
and ’’consumers commodities” . the former being a subset of the set of 
i npu t s .
(3) It is not fully a necessary and sufficient condition because 
efficiency in a stricter sense is used in the sufficient condition 
[see Scarf, p. 414 and 424].
(4) It is to be noticed that input-distributivity has implications on 
the revenue function r(a.p^) = Max p^ • b subject to (a.b) € Y, which 
are symetrical to those of the cost function under output-
distributivity, and vice-versa: superhomogeneity, superadditivity and
a related form of supportability.
(5) Further results along these lines are given in Mirman, Tauman and 
Zang (1985). In particular, under cost complementarity, any non­
decreasing cost function satisfying c(0) > 0 is supportable by Aumann- 
Shapley average cost prices. See also Sharkey and Telser (1973) for 
necessary and sufficient conditions for supportabi1ity of a cost
f unc t i on.
(6) See Hildenbrand (1974, p.21) for definitions and properties of 




























































































(7) By convex, we mean: x > x' implies Ax + (l-A)x' * x ’ for all A.
0 < A S 1 .
(8) The term average cost is here used appropriately because costs 
are actually minimised at an equilibrium.
(9) For a given cost function c(b). output prices q are anonymously 
equitable if q.b = c(b). where b is compatible with demand, and 
q.b' i c(b') for all b'. 0 < b' i b. They are subsidy free if the 
same conditions are satisfied for all the b' obtained from b by setting 
at 0 any of its coordinates [see Faulhaber and Levison (1981) and 
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